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Abstract
Tax evasion is an important social-economic problem in all societies of the world, regardless of the type of tax system or the 
country's economic development level, therefore deception using tax incentives or tax evasion should be analyzed in a wider 
context, as the key aspect of shadow economy. Modern economic studies, analyzing the interaction between taxpayers, tax 
burden, social environment and country's economic development, seek to make an integrated evaluation, not just explain 
individual tax avoidance motivations. The theoretical research analyzes the interaction between the taxpayer behavior and their 
social status, and not only individual motivations reasons to explain the level of tax evasion and as results of research - model's 
framework is unique incorporation of detection models and big data processing ability, combined with a psychological-social 
portrait of the tax evaders will allow their quick identification, even though this does not mean that they will have committed an 
illegal act.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Introduction
Shadow economy is defined and measured as unofficial sector of economy, when certain activities are performed 
and income from these activities generated avoiding government regulation or tax payment obligations (Schneider, 
2007), and large scale of shadow economy in developing countries shows inefficiency of tax systems in these 
countries (Torgler & Alm, 2009). In most studies shadow economy is assessed on the basis of calculation of the tax 
JDS HYDOXDWLQJ WD[ GLVFUHSDQF\ EHFDXVH RI WD[ DYRLGDQFH RU KLGLQJ .UXPSO\Wơ  $QRWKHU UHOHYDQW IDFWRU
affecting the level of declared income is taxpayer's satisfaction with government policy. Barth et al., (2005) explains 
tax evasion as social phenomenon, which is based on different perception of income tax between different tax payers 
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and income groups. Cowell (1990) emphasizes that tax evasion requires interaction with social theory, because 
provision of public goods is relevant to social environment level. The purpose of this study is theoretical research to 
conduct model's framework of the relationship between determinants of tax evasion by reviewed author’s
dimensions and tax evasion across countries, using several measures of tax evasion. Moreover, this study extends 
the preliminary tax evasion model of Allingham & Sandmo (1972) to examine in conjunction with culture, the 
impact of legal, political, and social variables on tax evasion in big data processing ability. Behavior of tax-evaders 
can be partially explained by analyzing factors related to social interaction and social characteristics of the 
individual. According to Andreoni et al. (1998), there are moral and social factors that influence the decision to 
avoid taxes. Among these factors is the feeling of guilt and shame, experienced by the participants who do not 
declare all their income. The neo-classical approach literature on tax compliance argues that there is a direct 
important link with possible penalties, when trying to understand why citizens pay or evade taxes (Schneider & 
Enste, 2002).
1. Literature review
Shadow economy causes are classified according to the motives into three main groups: economic, legal-
administrative, social-psychological. These groups do not function independently, but rather as different intensity 
components of the whole. Allingham & Sandmo (1972) proposed a microeconomic model to assess the level of tax 
evasion. The idea of this model is that the taxpayer, before declaring income, must decide and choose how much 
revenue he will reveal, knowing that there is some certain probability of a tax audit. A-S model assumes that the 
taxpayer's utility function is associated with the audit risk and his operational argument is undeclared tax revenue.
The income level is chosen so as to maximize his expected utility. This choice depends on the probability of 
detection, on his risk aversion and on the penalty fine. Yitzhaki (1974) pointed out that in this model an increase in 
the tax share leads to an ambiguous effect on tax evasion. It means that the tax rate has no effect on the terms of the 
tax evasion gamble and also it should be taken into account the fact that the penalty is usually imposed not on the 
concealed income, but it is rather related to the unpaid amount of tax. The interaction between the government and 
the taxpayer leads to a variety of equilibria dependent on parameters such as costs, tax rates and so on. The penalty 
fine for not reporting the true income is not proportional to the reported income, but to the nonpaid portion of the tax 
rate. With this, the ambiguity would be prone to disappear (Pantojaa & Rodrigo, 2014). There is a wide gap between 
the risk aversion that would guarantee such a high compliance and the much lower individual risk aversion observed 
in reality (Frey & Feld, 2002). The A–S model may be also rewritten considering that the sum of bribe is 
proportional to the tax evaded (Pruzhansky, 2004). This suggestion is reasonable as a larger amount of evaded taxes 
may require more financial efforts to persuade the auditor to cooperate. Allingham & Sandmo also considered 
another factor – the influence of personal character, i.e. when the detected tax evasion can ruin the reputation. The 
level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, 
many researchers have argued that tax morale can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (Torgler, 2007). 
Tax morale - which is not a new notion but has received surprisingly little attention in the tax compliance literature -
can be defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in contributing to society by paying taxes. The first major 
tax evasion literature review by Jackson and Milliron (1986) established 14 key determinants of tax evasion. These 
include: 
x demographic determinants – age, gender, education, occupation status;
x economic determinants – income level, income source, marginal tax rates, sanctions and probability of detection;
x behavioral determinants – complexity, fairness, revenue authority initiated contact, compliant peers, ethics or tax 
morale.
Study of Riahi-Belkaou (2004) analyses relationship between selected determinants of tax morale and tax evasion 
and systematically investigates many of the key determinants of tax evasion on a cross-country basis – non-
economic determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion: complexity, education, income source, fairness, tax 
morale. Empirical results show that behavioral and demographic variables have the strongest influence on tax 
evasion as compared to economic variables. This represents an interesting empirical finding which indicates that 
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non-economic variables are fundamental and should be investigated along with economic variables in ‘mixed 
models’ of tax evasion across countries (Richardson, 2006). Jackson and Milliron’s (1986) study considers the 
impact of 10 key variables: age, gender, education, income level, income source, marginal tax rates, fairness, 
complexity, revenue authority initiated contact and tax morale - the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance and the 
lower the level of individualism, legal enforcement, trust in government, and religiosity, the higher is the level of tax 
evasion across countries. The relevance of investigating not only institutional or governance quality, but also social 
norms or tax morale – the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes – has emerged, as empirical and experimental findings 
indicate that deterrence models predict far too little compliance and far too much tax evasion (Torgler et.al, 2006). 
Cummings; Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler (2009) argue that the size of the underground economy can serve as a 
useful, if somewhat imperfect, measure of the extent of tax evasion. So a negative correlation between the size of the 
shadow economy and tax morale indicates the extent to which individuals’ revealed actions are related to their
attitudes about paying taxes (Schneider, 2012). All these analyzes consider the interactions among taxpayers, not just 
individual motivations to explain tax evasion. Naturally, the first step against tax evasion phenomenon is increasing
the severity of combating tax evasion. Failure to act drastically against tax evasion phenomenon leads to the 
perpetuation of a genuine escapist gene, passed on from generation to generation, having long-term negative effects. 
Empirical studies of tax impacts face many challenges. Theory suggests that tax burdens reduce economic incentives 
and thus impose a drag on economic activity. Alternatively, high quality public capital and services can enhance 
economic activity by complementing private activities.
2. The model and the method
The model aim is to consider more realistic aspects of tax administration, as well as some factors that are difficult 
to measure, EXW DUH DFNQRZOHGJHG DV LPSRUWDQW RQHV IRU H[DPSOH VRFLDO QRUPV $QFLǌWơ 	 .URSLHQơ 
Complexity is the most important determinant of tax evasion. Other significant determinants of tax evasion are 
denoted by education, income source, fairness and tax morale – existence of a moral or intrinsic motivation for 
paying taxes, which was designated as “tax morale”, which is connected to Tax Culture level. Tax Culture signals 
about the tax system participants' behavior, which depends on the country's economic development level, social 
situation of the country's citizens and application of taxation instrumentation. These factors indicate their importance 
LQ WKH SURFHVV RI WD[ HYDVLRQ âLPNǌQLHQơ Tax morale and culture was positively associated with social 
capital, political participation, and immigration, but negatively associated with dissatisfaction with essential public 
services and unemployment. Russo (2014) find that self-employed, younger and less educated individuals were more 
likely to evade taxes, and that this propensity was positively associated with the crime rate and the unemployment 
rate, but negatively related to social capital. The determinants of tax evasion by reviewed authors are clearly 
identified in a systematic way by empirical analysis. The potential reason for some of the inconsistent findings in 
previous tax evasion studies is that researchers are not taking into account interactions between the key tax evasion 
determinants. Most econometric studies is a lack of coherence with the applicability of obtained theoretical results, 
their integration into the analytical processes or their comparison with existing models that have practical application 
experience. This study aims to compare the determinants of tax evasion, analyzed in the scientific literature, with tax 
fraud model, used in practice and to determine their factor differences or supplement model with material factors. 
Often performed research is difficult to apply because of far-reaching application difficulties, when such dilemma 
arises: 
Correlation V.S. Causation                            What are trends?    What happened?    What to do?
SAS Solution for Enterprise Data Analytics model is analyzed, which, according to Wylde, 2015 SAS has a 
leading-edge anti-fraud solution. SAS has been developing and deploying solutions to help customers detect, 
manage and prevent fraud, model uses big data Advanced Analytics statistical methods: Clustering/Segmentation, 
Data Mining, Predictive modeling, Advanced Statistical Analysis, Cause-Effect Validation. 
Model is based on business intelligence, reporting, data mining and data integration processes and big data 
processing possibilities. One of the key processes is big data integration, because the comparison of different 
statistical methods and different tax databases allows detections of irregularities. Business intelligence and tax 
evasion simulation model allows online to recreate conditions, in which tax evasion processes take place, and to 
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migrate all information onto one platform in order to analyze transactions and customer activity and in real time 
perform verification and data validation, develop new types of fraud models and tune existing models to improve 
fraud detection efficiency and create reports for case manager.
Table 1. Hybrid approach to fraud detection, integration of different stage of patterns
Suitable for associative link 
patterns
Suitable for known
patterns
Suitable for unknown
patterns
Suitable for complex
patterns
Social Network Analysis
Knowledge discovery 
through associative link 
analysis
Rules
Type business and activity to 
filter fraudulent behaviors
Anomaly Detection
Detect individual and aggregated 
abnormal patterns
Predictive Models
Hybrid Approach fraud detection model uses typical key tax evasion determinants and factors in assessment of 
perpetrator characteristics from practician’s, theorist’s user point of view and is based on different reliability level 
factor integration. Some of these factors are tested, others only implied by typical behaviors and attributes. Creation 
of tax evasion model is based on individual's and his environment's social analysis, business rules, anomaly 
characteristics and typical fraud monitoring models.
Table 2. Typical perpetrator activity report by individual's activity danger level
Behavioral warning signs of their
misdeeds (green light- start 
process)
Opportunity “Yellow light” Pressure “Red light ” Process in motion
Living beyond their means Inadequate internal controls High personal debts Everyone else does it
Financial difficulties Large amounts of cash on hand or 
processed.
Living beyond their means Needed the money
Exhibiting control issues –
unwillingness to share duties 
Ineffective or no internal audit Excessive investment 
speculation
Felt cheated and wanted revenge
Unusually close relationship 
with vendor/customer
Weak management or excessive 
turnover
Excessive gambling Intended to pay it back
Wheeler dealer attitude. Too “cozy” with suppliers Substance abuse Bribe/kickback to tempting.
Irritability, suspiciousness or 
defensiveness
No rotation of job duties among 
employees
Job frustration Not compensated fairly
Addiction problems Procedures not well 
understood/always in crisis mode
Resentment of superiors
Refusal to take vacation Annual vacation or sick days not 
taken
Family problems Extra-marital affairs No recent raises/cost of living 
adjustments
Prepared according to MIS Training Institute © Brown Smith Wallace Session, 2014
Behavior type allows identification of fraud risk factors, fraud risks and fraud schemes. It is therefore necessary 
to have different assessments, and when reaching their critical mass to signal the fraud likelihood, i.e. implement 
anti-fraud control activities model, based on developed fraud risk links to identify activities, where possibly illegal 
activity takes place. The alerts are then surfaced in an easy to understand interface and can be integrated with model 
case management solution.
Auditors and employees should be trained to recognize the common behavioral signs that a fraud is occurring. It 
should be noted, that operations by persons affiliated by family, vicinity, community or business links are also 
analyzed and evaluated. Effective fraud prevention measures are possible, when monitoring effectiveness is high, 
anti-fraud program and control have sufficiently precise data, analytic theoretical background and digital processor. 
Anomaly detection then detects individual and aggregated abnormal patterns. Predictive models are created to assess 
against known fraud cases. Analyzed flow diagram shows how the solution uses data for exploratory information 
analysis and transformation, connected business rules and then applies advanced analytics such as anomaly 
detection, predictive modeling and social network analysis to generate alerts. Internal controls alone are insufficient 
to fully prevent occupational fraud. Analyzed flow diagram shows how the solution uses data for exploratory 
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information analysis and transformation, connected business rules and then applies advanced analytics such as 
anomaly detection, predictive modeling and social network analysis to generate alerts.
.
Fig. 1. Tax evasion process flow diagram. Prepared by the author according to the source: 
http://www.mmd.admin.state.mn.us/DataAnalytics/pdf/TaxSAS.pdf
Internal controls alone are insufficient to fully prevent occupational fraud. Model key functional components are 
built on the foundation of reporting, analytics and data quality/integration tools. These additional components are:
Detection and Alert Generation    Link and Association Analysis Alert Management    Case Management
At first, sharing information and communication of different kinds of data resources is performed. Method of 
using IRS (Internal Revenue Service), government and third-party data sources and records to complement state 
income tax, Social network analysis adds knowledge discovery through associative link analysis and can help 
identify organized fraud rings. This hybrid approach proactively applies a combination of all four analysis 
approaches at the entity and network levels and ensures that fraud does not slip through the cracks. Individual Master 
File (IMF) and periodic data from other state agencies are also used to identify potential cases. Inconsistency in data 
between different sources requires close scrutiny for soft matching criteria. Data sources have different levels of 
reliability and prior to using the data for specific searches it is important to define how the data elements will be 
applied and what the output should look like. In recent years, technology advances have given the world 
exponentially more data to look at, think about and analyze it again. Each situation, business type, state is unique, 
but there are many commonalities. Because the nature of the evasion or fraud must be known to create the rule, 
business rules once established can then be worked around by perpetrators of fraud. When the value of business rules 
in the detection and prevention of fraud are fully appreciated and understood, a hybrid approach can been used, 
which combines business rules in theory predictions with anomaly detection, predictive analytics and associative 
link analysis. The model's general idea and solution is “learn and improve” cycle in order to fine-tune results over 
time as more information is added to the system. Predictive assessment is made against known fraud cases to 
determine if there is an active relative relationship for the taxpayer. 
3. Results
Framework can be configured and customized to the country requirements, its usability and configurability allows 
to meet specific needs for a given user community and to create a control environment. This configurability allows 
different user groups from different LOB areas to use the system in the most productive manner for their particular 
case. Many aspects of the Framework are configurable such as scoring methods, prioritization, case management, 
work flow and alert management. Fraud monitoring algorithms and scoring models require constant refreshing, so as 
to be staying a step ahead of the fraudsters. The model's framework is unique incorporation of line-of-business 
Operation
source
Tax records
Income tax
VAT tax
IRS/IMF
Exploratory data 
analysis & 
transformation
Fraud data 
staging
Generation risk process 
Alerts tax evasion 
knowledge 
center
SAS social 
network analysis:
x Rules;
x Network 
analyses
Business 
rules & 
tax evasion 
simulation 
Analytics
1. Anomaly detection;
2. Predictive modeling.
Social network
Third parts
Learn & improve cycle Reporting/Case manager
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specific detection models and big data processing ability, combined with a psychological-social portrait of the tax 
evaders will allow their quick identification, even though this does not mean that they will have committed an illegal 
act. These functions will detect both claims and premium fraud and can be applied to recipient as well as provider 
aspects of the program process. Fraud reporting is a critical component of an effective fraud prevention and 
detection system. The main benefit of the model is to create such extensibility and flexibility circumstances that 
would create in taxpayers' subconsciousness maximal risk level of avoiding taxes - auditing probability 99%. This 
would enable in long-term period, by respectively adjusting tax system components, to reduce shadow economy 
level. Duplication of different data in revenue generation programs create unnecessary public contact and confusion 
and frustration on the part of the recipient. Clearly defined and well thought out requirements will save a lot of time 
and frustration. Most frauds are detected by tips (43,3%) and anti-fraud training (management review 14.6%) for 
employees and managers results in lower fraud losses. Occupational fraud is a global problem – trends in fraud 
schemes, perpetrator characteristics and anti-fraud controls are similar regardless of where the fraud occurred. 
Discussion/conclusions
The decision to evade taxes and engage in informal activities is influenced by tax enforcement policy, namely 
evasion penalties and detection probabilities. Financial fraud is an incredibly dynamic phenomenon – and fraud 
models have a very short shelf life – a simple tax system and full information about activity of agents can reduce tax 
evasion. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to fraud due to far fewer controls in place. There is a need to 
focus on hotlines and setting an ethical tone. Wage and salary income subject to withholding (e.g., services 
employment income) is another important curb on tax evasion. In addition, perceptions that tax policy is fair are 
associated with reduced levels of tax evasion. Increased knowledge of tax evasion opportunities has a negative 
influence on tax compliance as it assists non-compliance. For tax evasion internationally it is necessary to design and 
implement appropriate strategies to minimize its damaging effects. This should lead to improvements in tax revenue 
collection by governments. Finally, where tax morale is high, lower levels of tax evasion can be expected. These 
specific insights should allow government policy-makers to gain a better understanding of the key variables that are 
significantly associated.
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